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Introduction
In the recent hyper-partisan political era, policy arenas where even modest agreements exist are becoming
increasingly rare. However, both ends of the political spectrum have joined a consistent refrain during the first
quarter of this century to reform various parts of the criminal justice system. Often, these calls for reform are
sparked by a highly publicized event or an eventual acceptance of decades-old trends that scholars and advocates
have taken pains to evidence. Contrary to many recent cries forewarning the crumbling of the American
democratic tradition, the proposal outlined herein suggests actions that can be taken by conservatives and liberals
collectively to alter the ways in which crime and criminality are addressed in our society. This need for action is
particularly true during these divisive times, even if the exact nature of the reforms is debatable.
Most recently, local, state, and federal officials have sought to address shortcomings in the policing and legal
systems that undermine the legitimacy of the policing system. In particular, policymakers have attempted to
respond to cries for social justice, racial equity, and procedural justice through a variety of executive and
legislative methods, such as the creation of oversight committees, passing new legislation, increasing
accountability controls, and reallocating public funding. Although insufficient data exist to evaluate the
effectiveness of some of these new measures, the decentralized nature of the systems that these reforms are
attempting to impact and the ambiguous goals they set to achieve stymies the furtherance of evidence-based
practice (EBP) that has come to be expected in modern human service agencies. By doing so, reform efforts take
on a political character that does not lend itself to data-driven evaluation and is more commonly driven by the
differing political climates of loosely connected jurisdictions.
In an effort to encourage a greater degree of centralized oversight and evaluation in the formation and
implementation of policy, this article will begin by examining the inherent political influences affecting policing
and identify how this relationship can impede the EBP approach. Despite several states’ attempts to impose
multiple accountability measures that law enforcement agencies demonstrate “just” and “equitable” treatment of
citizens, the evaluation of such policies is undermined by the politically interpretable nature of these terms.
Furthermore, organizational elements, administrative factors, and the nature of police work further complicate
such evaluations.
Second, this article will examine recent legislative activity surrounding wrongful convictions in Missouri to
provide an example of how changes to law enforcement policy could be more evidence-based and protect perhaps
the most sacrosanct element of the justice system, justice. Specifically, we suggest changes that can be made to
the eyewitness identification process that have been attempted in other jurisdictions and can lead to more accurate
eyewitness identification. This can, in turn, not only lower the risk of wrongful convictions, but can also help
ensure that the actual perpetrators of crimes are brought to justice.
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Despite proposed legislation in recent years, Missouri has yet to pass bills that seek to mandate evidence-based
practices in regard to eyewitness identification protocols. We argue herein that statewide legislation,
encompassing a series of reforms in regard to eyewitness identifications is an important and necessary step to
police reform. These changes are very low risk, with minimal cost and consequences. They are fairly
straightforward and simple to implement, and do not require extensive training nor major policy overhauls within
the respective departments. Importantly, they are not controversial and are therefore far more politically feasible
than other reforms proposed.
Given that there appears to be agreement across the political spectrum that the policing system needs reform, and
the recent catapulting of this policy arena to a position of prominence, we advocate for policy that is well defined,
able to be evaluated, and replicable rather than submission to political rhetoric. Without such evidence-based
policy, the likelihood of exacerbating disparities, further damaging criminal justice system legitimacy, and
undermining core legal tenets within the criminal justice system increases as political climates and narratives will
be the ultimate judge of which policies are “effective.”
Historical Foundations of Political Controversy Involving the Police
Since the time of their founding, the police have been mired in political controversy. Prior to the establishment
of the world’s first modern police force in London in 1829, opponents decried the presence of an armed,
militaristic governmental force that could be used to suppress the will of the people and undermine democracy.1
The American policing tradition has been no less controversial in light of practices such as the much-derided
slave patrols prior to the Civil War, oppression of labor movements, and the appointment of law enforcement
officers to further the objectives of political leaders during the spoils system of the early 20th century.
During the professionalization era, improvements in hiring and conduct standards won acclaim in some
jurisdictions, but would not be institutionalized nationally for nearly fifty more years. Nonetheless, consistent
examples of abuse of power, discrimination, and brutality continued to capture the public’s interest, and generated
wide-scale political action from citizens and elected officials. Simultaneously, the innovations of automobiles and
communications technology distanced officers from the communities.
In response to criticism and public outcry, community policing was developed out of the findings of President
Johnson’s 1967 Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice to reconnect the police and
the community and enhance legitimacy. Although this approach continues to be advocated by national and field
leaders, numerous challenges exist with respect to implementing community policing. Notably, defining the
parameters of a community can be difficult and the many ways in which community policing is implemented
stymie evaluation and, therefore, creation of “best practices.” As a result, critics contend that the implementation
of this approach is better characterized as a public relations tool rather than a crime-fighting strategy.
Consequently, the evidence-based policing era arrived and advocates began lobbying for the logical allocation of
police resources to address crime and criminality based upon data analytics and the best available research.
Unfortunately, the wealth of controversy surrounding the goals of the police, racial unrest, and level of authority
granted to police in recent years suggest that implementation of this approach may be lacking in many
jurisdictions. To better understand the impediments to improved police practice, it is essential to review the
political nature of policing perspectives and how organizational and administrative processes perpetuate
politically driven responses to crime as opposed to research-driven responses.
Joseph M. Zlatic is an Associate Professor of Law, Crime and Social Justice at Webster University in Webster Groves, Missouri.
Jeanie Thies is a Professor of Political Science at Lindenwood University in St. Charles, Missouri.
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“Crime and Punishment,” The National Archives (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland), accessed July 22, 2021,
https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/candp/prevention/g08/g08cs2.htm.
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Perspectives on Policing
Although many perspectives exist on how and why police agencies operate, the crime control perspective and the
due process perspective are the two primary viewpoints juxtaposed in this analysis. These normative viewpoints
represent the polar ends of a scale that contain numerous, often coexisting, perspectives of how police agencies
should operate.
In short, the crime control perspective prioritizes the suppression of crime and maintaining the safety of the
community. Closely aligned with a conservative, “law and order” approach that suggests crime is the result of
individual choice, this perspective emphasizes a utilitarian ideology that police action is taken with “noble cause”
to punish criminal offenders and enhance the quality of life for citizens.2 Agencies aligning themselves with this
mentality may offer the classic, well-known motto of, To Protect and Serve. Not surprisingly, the crime control
perspective holds that public safety goals supersede certain violations of civil liberties and minimizes the
importance of procedural safeguards in the interest of achieving the paradigm’s overarching goals.
In contrast, the due process model of policing is more aligned with a liberal mentality that denotes crime is a
result of negative environmental influences and emphasizes the protection of individual rights and liberties. In
doing so, the discretionary authority of the police is restricted by civil liberties and procedural safeguards to ensure
individualized, fair, and equitable treatment for justice-involved individuals.3 Agencies operating under this
mentality may offer the modern derivation motto of To Serve and Protect. Consequently, this perspective
recognizes that some level of crime and criminality will go unaddressed in the interest of protecting certain civil
liberties by limiting the power of governmental agents to investigate and prosecute criminal acts.
However, given that dichotomous thinking can often create overly simplified understandings, a need exists to
clarify the ways in which the crime control and due process perspectives arise. To be clear, virtually every police
agency will exhibit characteristics of both perspectives at different times. However, as a result of political climate,
organizational factors, and administrative priorities, agencies often emphasize one of these perspectives more
commonly than the other.
Goal Ambiguity
Complicating the influence of historical factors and clashing normative concerns, goal ambiguity is often cited as
a politically-driven factor that diminishes the success of public organizations4 In the context of the current analysis
and as part of the national push for reform, it is worthwhile to consider the question: what are desirable outcomes
for police agencies and how are these influenced? Moreover, if we accept the police mottos emphasizing
protection and service or vice versa, other questions arise, such as: what does each look like in practice; How is
each completed; Do some people/areas warrant more than others?
Of course, the wide range of possible answers to such a question are heavily dependent on an individual’s political
leanings. Often, purportedly objective metrics of policing outcomes have been conceptualized as measurements
of crime rates, response times, clearance rates, and types of work conducted (e.g., number of arrests/citations
issued). More recently, citizen satisfaction has gained prominence as an important measure of police success.5
Kent Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process,” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-) 89, no. 2 (1999): pp.
671-717, accessed July 1, 2021, https://doi.org/10.2307/1144140.
3
Ibid.
4
Antonio Botti and Antonella Monda, “Goal Ambiguity in Public Organizations: A Systematic Literature Review,” International
Journal of Business and Management 14, no. 7 (2019): 137, accessed at https://doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v14n7p137.
5
Malcolm K. Sparrow, “Measuring Performance in a Modern Police Organization,” New Perspectives in Policing Bulletin (US
Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2015), accessed June 8, 2021, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248476.pdf.
2
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However, these agencies’ abilities to achieve these core outcomes are often impacted by the many supplemental
activities carried out by the police. As the most visible and most accessible part of the criminal justice system,
police are often tasked with a myriad of responsibilities for which they have limited training or resources to
address. Historically, officers have been asked to resolve issues such as poor parenting practices, neighbor
disputes, truancy, and homelessness. Given the finite nature of resources available to public agencies, every effort
directed toward resolving these more far-reaching social issues that are only tangentially related to criminal
offending reduces the ability of agencies to achieve the core metrics on which they are judged.
Nonetheless, policymakers continue to provide politically influenced mandates that police agencies be responsible
for ever-expanding roles. Coupled with increased mandates that police agencies become more accountable in
documenting and measuring their practices, this mission creep extends police resources further. In doing so, the
complexity of these positions is extended to a point that cannot be achieved and damages the popular legitimacy
of police efficacy.
This negative reinforcing loop further damages the ability of police agencies to achieve their core objectives in
that ensuring legitimacy is fundamental to the public’s willingness to contact the police when crime occurs as
well as cooperating with police in the investigation of criminal activity. Going a step further, the report of the
President’s Commission on 21st Century Policing6 suggests legitimacy as essential to maintaining stable
communities and ensuring democracy. Policymakers would do well to assess how police legitimacy may be
impacted in the varied roles in which officers are expected to act as well as the impossibility of adequately
resolving all of the social ills that they are asked to address when proposing far-reaching reforms.
Police Organization and Administration
The existing organization and administration of police organizations further politicizes these agencies and
complicates the implementation of EBP reforms. Overwhelmingly, policing is conducted at the local level of
government. As a result, each agency has a relatively high degree of autonomy and can choose what level of
cooperation to grant to neighboring agencies or ones with co-occurring jurisdiction. As criminal activity is
generally unimpeded by jurisdictional boundaries, the level of cooperation granted between agencies can be a
significant factor in impacting policing outcomes. However, as each agency is held accountable only for the
outcomes in its own jurisdiction, little incentive exists to cooperate unless a direct benefit can be displayed to
each agency. In practice, the nature of this administration results in multiple loosely connected organizations
engaging in fluctuating practices under varying policy directives and political agendas that are geared toward
achieving self-interested goals. Such decentralized organization is inherently antithetical to EBP implementation.
The ongoing “defund the police” movement provides another indication of the political nature of police
organizations. This commonly misrepresented movement most often seeks to reallocate portions of policing
budgets to other social organizations who are dedicated to addressing known variables correlated with criminal
activity such as mental health services, substance abuse treatment, and unemployment. The targeting of police
resources implies participation in a highly political budgetary process where public agencies must compete for
funding based upon the political ideologies of those in power. As would be the case for any organization, drastic
changes to funding will necessitate the alteration of organizational functioning that may not be grounded in
empirical evidence and may produce negative outcomes.
Further frustrating efforts to become more evidence-based can be found by examining police officer recruitment,
training, and turnover. As of this writing, a significant national decline has occurred in applicants for policing
“Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing” (US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services, 2015), accessed July 14, 2021 , https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.
6
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positions.7 This may in part be attributed to negative public perceptions of police in the wake of scandals such as
the 2020 murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis. Similarly, while the professionalization era of policing
institutionalized a specialized education component for policing in the form of academy training, police agencies
overwhelmingly require no more than a high school education to qualify for employment. Additionally, curricula
for academies rarely present empirical research on which policing practices have been evidenced to be most
effective in achieving outcomes. Third, above-average rates of turnover are routinely noted in policing literature
and a recent increase in retirements in the wake of highly publicized negative police events has contributed to a
personnel shortage. Collectively, the political and structural impact of these personnel elements to the
implementation of EBP is easily understood.
With respect to the structure of individual agencies, their paramilitary nature ideally provides for a chain-ofcommand that extends from a chief officer and a span on control that provides authority to lower-level leaders for
oversight for a set number of officers, along with other responsibilities. Although this traditional top-down
structure has been criticized and some organizations have attempted to flatten it, doing so further decentralizes
decision making and provides for less oversight by chief officers. Irrespective of a top-down or flatter
organizational structure, the chief executive positions of these agencies are often highly politicized appointees
whose national average tenure is estimated to be between four and six years,8 with the Police Executive Research
Forum (PERF) providing estimates as low as two-and-a-half years for chiefs in major metropolitan areas.9 Thus,
leadership and policy initiative changes occur frequently. Again, such a dynamic and unpredictable environment
is not conducive to evaluation and implementation of “best practices” on a wide scale. Thus, this article argues
that state-wide mandates represent the most likely course of action for effecting reform in the use of eyewitness
identification that are based on established empirical findings.
The variables that constitute this organizational and administrative structure contribute to the conclusion offered
by one seminal scholar who notes, the work of the police is “impossible to do in ideal terms.”10 This conclusion
is based on observations that demand for police services will always outpace the supply, the circumstances of
interactions with the police are generally neither voluntarily sought nor desirable, there is an absence of “perfect”
solutions to the many problems police are asked to address, and organizational decision making is often driven
down the organizational chart to the officers delivering service on the front lines. These officers effectively then
have the power to create new organizational policy by the routine ways in which they interact with the public
which may or may not align with organizational policy. Thus, it is essential to keep in mind how historical,
political, economic, and organizational variables within and across jurisdictions may impact reform efforts as we
turn our analysis to examining modern calls for change.
The Politics of Recent Reform Proposals
Despite these many impediments, widespread public and political support exists for reform. Within recent years,
legislatures, executive agencies, advocates, and accrediting bodies have sought to implement numerous reforms
that can be broadly categorized (see Table 1).

“Workforce Survey June 2021,” Police Executive Research Forum, June 11, 2021, accessed July 19, 2021,
https://www.policeforum.org/workforcesurveyjune2021.
8
Yudu Li and Ben Brown, “Police Chief Turnover in Texas: An Exploratory Analysis Of Peer-Evaluation Survey Data Pertinent to
Police Performance and Turnover,” Police Quarterly 22, no. 4 (August 2019): 391-415, accessed July 16, 2021,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611119845664.
9
Ben Klayman and Tim Reid, “U.S. Police Chiefs Vulnerable as Crime Rates, Media Pressures RISE,” Reuters, December 15, 2015,
accessed July 20, 2021, https://mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/idUKKBN0TY0GJ20151215.
10
Michael Lipksy, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation,
1980).
7
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Table 1
Categories and Examples of Recent Police Reform Proposals and Implementations
Categories
of
Reforms Examples
Proposed/Implemented
Creating Oversight Boards/Commissions
Improve Accountability
Use of Body Cameras
Increasing Data Collection
Instituting Chokehold Bans
Limit Use of Force
Requiring De-Escalation Training
Eliminating Access to Military-Style Equipment
Implementing Implicit Bias Training
Improve Diversity
Requiring Cultural Competency Training
Enhancing Recruitment of Minority Populations
“Defunding” the Police
Reallocate Police Resources
Removing School Resource Officers from Schools
Limiting/Altering Opportunities for Grant Funding
Incorporating Social Workers/Mental Health Professionals
Enhance Partnerships
Enhancing Collaboration with Community Agencies
Eliminating Qualified Immunity for Police Officers
Legal Reforms
Enhancing Authority and Penalties of Civil Rights Statues
Eliminating “No-Knock” Warrants
While this list is not comprehensive, it reflects significant themes that have been the subject of intense political
debate. The mere existence of these political debates have the ability to significantly impact police practices and
outcomes in an attempt to respond to public demands. Often, these measures were implemented in response to a
single or series of odious events where police officers acted horrendously. In other cases, these measures are in
response to systemic challenges that have endured throughout the nation’s history. Collectively, however, these
measures drastically alter the environment of policing and further inhibit the evaluation of policing under
traditional metrics.
Moreover, while legitimate outrage exists over instances of police misconduct, racial injustice, and the excessive
use of force, evidence is still insufficient or mixed in regard to many of the reforms proposed to improve police
outcomes. For instance, while logic dictates that a reallocation of police funding to community agencies that are
dedicated to addressing social issues may lower the crime rate, this proposal has not been validated empirically
on a wide scale and is largely based upon the aforementioned politically minded, liberal-leaning, due process
perspective of policing. Such an observation is not to argue that the method should not be attempted, but rather
emphasize the fact that the policy is more politically based than evidence-based. Similar observations could be
made for nearly all of the proposed reforms listed.
To be clear, the overwhelming calls for reform from various sectors of society suggest that change is needed.
However, our argument does not advocate that liberal or conservative approaches hold supremacy and that one
or the other will produce the best outcomes. We see value in various approaches offered by both political
perspectives. Instead, our position is that reforms must account for the multiple variables that impact the work of
the police and be based in evidence rather than political rhetoric. To that end, our analysis now turns to a specific
policy reform pertaining to eyewitness identification.
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Eyewitness Identification
Eyewitnesses to crimes or events before or after crimes often provide crucial evidence to law enforcement and in
court trials and play a key role in how cases are processed through the criminal justice system. It is not uncommon
for convictions to hinge heavily or even solely on the testimony of one or more eyewitnesses who identify an
accused person as the perpetrator. Yet there is an extensive body of literature, most of which emerged in the later
part of the 20th century, regarding the fallibility of memory and accuracy of eyewitness accounts of events.11
Hundreds of field studies and controlled experiments have repeatedly confirmed that eyewitness identification is
fraught with problems. Factors such as how lineups or photos of suspects are presented to eyewitnesses, whether
the eyewitness and suspect are of different races or age groups, age of the eyewitness, varying facial recognition
skills, and amount of stress the witness experienced at the time of the crime/event as well as at the point of
identification all have been found to influence accuracy. Conditions such as lighting/visibility at the crime scene
and presence of a weapon, as well as other incidental crime scene variables might distract a witness’s attention
and further diminish identification accuracy.
Garrett analyzed data from the first 250 cases in which someone was ultimately exonerated using DNA
evidence.12 He found that the most prevalent factor contributing to wrongful conviction in these cases was
eyewitness misidentification, with this factor present in 76 percent (190) of the cases in this sample. And
according to the most recent data reported by the Innocence Project, misidentification played a role in 69 percent
of the more than 375 wrongful convictions that were overturned due to newly introduced DNA evidence. 13 This
percentage of cases with tainted eyewitness identification is sometime thought to be higher in the DNA
exonerations because these are frequently sexual assault cases that involved witnesses identifying a suspect. Thus,
eyewitness misidentification may be disproportionately linked to this type of case because they were more likely
to have relied on eyewitness testimony. However, when the National Registry of Exonerations examined the first
1,365 exonerations that they had compiled for this registry through April 2014, they reported that 75 percent of
the cases involved some type of misidentification.14 This sample includes the DNA exonerations as well as cases
in which exoneration resulted from other reasons. It is troubling that some cases involved deliberate manipulation
by law enforcement. Forms of manipulation included ordering a suspect to participate in the lineup wearing the
clothing very similar to what the victim reported the perpetrator wore, bringing out a suspect in a jail uniform,
and in nearly half of the cases (43/90), directly telling the victim who to pick.
Many of the cases that resulted in eventual exoneration of a defendant involved cross-race identification, with a
white eyewitness identifying a black suspect. Yet most people’s facial recognition skills for someone of a different
race or ethnic group are far inferior to facial recognition skills when they are asked to recognize faces of their
E. F. Loftus, D. G. Miller, and H. J. Burns, “Semantic Integration of Verbal Information into a Visual Memory,” Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 4, no. 1 (1978): 19–31, accessed June 30,
2021, https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.4.1.19; and G. L. Wells, “Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and
Estimator Variables,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, no. 12 (1978): 1546–1557, accessed June 15, 2021,
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.36.12.1546; and Gary L. Wells and Elizabeth A. Olson, “Eyewitness Testimony,” Annual Review
of Psychology 54 (February 2003): 277-295, accessed August 12, 2021,
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145028; and Gary L. Wells et al., “Policy and Procedure
Recommendations for the Collection and Preservation of Eyewitness Identification Evidence,” Law and Human Behavior 44, no. 1
(February 2020), accessed June 30, 2021, https://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2020-06220-002.html; and G. L. Wells and S. D. Penrod,
“Eyewitness Identification Research: Strengths and Weaknesses of Alternative Methods,” in Research Methods in Forensic
Psychology, eds. B. Rosenfeld and S. D. Penrod (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2011).
12
B. L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2011).
13
Innocence Project, Eyewitness Identification Reform, accessed July 21, 2021, https://innocenceproject.org/eyewitness-identificationreform/.
14
Kaitlin Jackson and Samuel Gross, “Tainted Identifications,” The National Registry of Exonerations, September 22, 2016, accessed
July 31, 2021, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/taintedids.aspx.
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own race or ethnic group.15 In their 2001 meta-analysis, Meissner and Brigham reviewed thirty-five research
studies that had examined this phenomenon, which collectively included ninety-one independent samples. They
concluded that both false positives (subjects thought they recognized a face that they had previously not seen, and
false negatives (subjects believed a face they had seen was unfamiliar), were significantly lower when the faces
viewed were of people who were the same race as the subject. This is true across different cultures and races.
Subsequent work has confirmed the prevalence of “own race bias,”16 though some evidence suggests that people
can be trained to get better at facial recognition.17 There is also research suggesting that increased exposure to
people of different races can improve accuracy of cross-race identification, but findings in this regard are mixed.18
A similar effect to the “race bias,” termed “own age bias,” holds true for facial recognition across age groups,
with people faring better at recognizing faces when they were of people of the same age or close to their age than
faces of people from other age groups.19
Research has further honed in on specific protocols and practices that law enforcement agencies can implement
to improve the accuracy of eyewitness identification.20 In the following section, we review these protocols and
practices, and discuss some of the empirical research supporting each.
Best practices for reforming use of eyewitness evidence
A 1998 white paper, commissioned by the American Psychology and Law Society that summarized the research
findings, was one of the earlier efforts to promulgate the best practices for which there was expert consensus.21
The following year, the National Institute of Justice published these same findings and recommendations in a law

C. A. Meissner and J. C. Brigham, “Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic
Review,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 7 (2001): 3–35.
16
P. M. Walker and M. Hewstone, “A Perceptual Discrimination Investigation of the Own-Race Effect and Intergroup
Experience,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 20, no. 4 (2006): 461–475, accessed June 30, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1191; and
G. Anzures, D. Kelly, and O. Pascalis, “Own-and Other-Race Face Identity Recognition in Children: The Effects of Pose and Feature
Composition,” Developmental Psychology 50, no. 2 (2014): 469–481, accessed at https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033166.
17
J. W. Tanaka and L. J. Pierce, “The Neural Plasticity of Other-Race Face Recognition,” Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral
Neuroscience 9 (2009): 122–131, accessed October 21, 2021,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/24043586_The_Neural_Plasticity_of_Other-Race_Face_Recognition
18
Steven G. Young et al., “Perception and Motivation in Face Recognition: A Critical Review of Theories of the Cross-Race Effect,”
Personality and Social Psychology Review 16, no. 2 (2011): 116-42, accessed June 30, 2021,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868311418987; and G. S. Goodman et al., “The Development of Memory for Own- and Other-Race
Faces,” Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 98, no. 4 (December 2007): 233–242, accessed July 15, 2021,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2007.08.004; and D. B. Wright, C. E. Boyd, and C. G. Tredoux, “Inter-Racial Contact and the OwnRace Bias for Face Recognition in South Africa and England,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 17, no. 3 (March 2003): 365–373,
accessed July 16, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.898.
19
J. S. Anastasi, M. G Rhodes, “An Own-Age Bias in Face Recognition for Children and Older Adults,” Psychonomic Bulletin &
Review 12 (2005): 1043–1047, accessed May 19, 2021, https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03206441.
20
G. L. Wells et al., “Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads,” Law and Human
Behavior 22, no. 6 (1998): 603–647, accessed July 15, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1025750605807; and Tim Valentine, Alan
Pickering and Stephen Darling, “Characteristics of Eyewitness Identification that Predict the Outcome of Real Lineups,” Applied
Cognitive Psychology 17, no. 8 (2003): 969, accessed October 21, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.939; and Daniel B. Wright and
Elin M. Skagerberg, “Post-Identification Feedback Affects Real Eyewitnesses,” Psychological Science 18, no. 2 (February 2007): 172,
accessed June 30, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01868.x; and Keith A. Findley, “Implementing the Lessons from
Wrongful Convictions: An Empirical Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Reform Strategies,” 81 Missouri Law Review 377 (2016),
University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1372, accessed June 2, 2021, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2713963; G. L.
Wells, “Eyewitness identification,” In Reforming Criminal Justice. Volume 2: Policing, ed. Erik Luna (Phoenix: Arizona State
University, 2017), 259‐278, August 20, 2021, https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2018/06/ADA-Reforming-Criminal-JusticeVol-II.pdf.
21
Gary L. Wells et al., “Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads,” Law and Human
Behavior 22, no. 6 (1998): 603, June 15, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1025750605807.
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enforcement manual titled, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement 22 and produced an updated
version, the Eyewitness Manual: A Trainer’s Manual for Law Enforcement, in 2003. In 2016, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police issued Eyewitness Identification: A Model Policy.23 These documents, along with
many other readily available resources, offer comprehensive, straightforward guides for implementing evidencebased protocols ranging from proper procedures to interviewing witnesses to methods for conducting photo and
in-person lineups.24 In 2014, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences released one of
the most thorough reports to date on the status of eyewitness identification in criminal investigations and
convictions. This report, titled Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification,25 included a series of
recommendations for law enforcement agencies collecting evidence via eyewitness identification, as well as
recommendations for introducing and challenging eyewitness testimony in the courtroom. The law enforcement
recommendations, listed below, reflect the most frequently recommended practices, and provide a useful, albeit
partial, template for crafting policy and legislation that can minimize error in eyewitness identification.
• Train all law enforcement officers in eyewitness identification, focusing specifically on factors that affect
vision and memory, and on procedures to prevent contamination.
• Document witness’s level of confidence in their judgments at the time of the identifications.
• Implement “double-blind” identification procedure in which the officer who administers an in-person or
photographic lineup does not know which of the people is the suspect, and thus cannot deliberately or
unintentionally influence the witness.
• Develop and use standardized witness instructions at identification procedures.
• Videotape all identification procedures.
There is a good deal of empirical evidence backing these recommendations. We do note, however, this evidence
is stronger for some measures than others. There are also studies that do not support their use, though these are
outnumbered by those that do. Moreover, critics point to methodological limitations in some of this nonsupportive research.
For example, one frequently recommended measure for ensuring the integrity of eyewitness evidence is requiring
that witnesses provide a rating signifying how confident they are that they have correctly identified a suspect at
the time of identification. A number of studies have revealed that witnesses’ confidence at the time of
identification was a strong predictor of accuracy in real-life and laboratory settings.26 Yet other research has
indicated it should not be given significant weight.27 High confidence ratings are seen as more fallible than low
confidence ones. Furthermore, encouragement from law enforcement officers present at the time identification is
made, or statements from the officers regarding certainty that the actual perpetrator is in a lineup or photo display
22
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tends to result in inflated confidence ratings. Law enforcement officer or other staff present when a witness views
a photograph or in-person lineup may give verbal or non-verbal cues when the witness selects the person law
enforcement believes to be the perpetrator, which also may boost confidence ratings. Also, unsurprisingly, when
police inform a witness that another witness chose the same suspect as they had from the lineup, confidence
ratings tend to increase.28 As we will discuss later in this article, this problem can be ameliorated through use of
“double-blind lineups” in which no one can be with the witness who knows who police believe is the perpetrator.
Low confidence ratings may be more accurate than high ratings, in that they reflect true hesitancy to make a
positive identification. Wixted and Wells have gone as far as to state that “value of a low-confidence ID is never
open to question.”29
Garrett’s aforementioned 2011 analysis of the DNA exonerations found that in 21 percent of the cases the
eyewitnesses had testified during the trial that they were initially uncertain regarding the identification.30 He also
noted that the true status of witnesses’ confidence at initial identification was generally unknown, and often could
be assumed only if it was raised at trial. This is one of the challenges to research regarding the significance of
confidence ratings, and in part accounts for the mixed findings. Berkowitz, Garrett, Fenn, and Loftus31 reviewed
the body of research examining relationship between eyewitnesses’ confidence in their identification of a suspect
and the accuracy of the identification age of the eyewitness, lineups where the suspect was likely innocent. They
argued that previous studies hyping the value of the confidence ratings were flawed in that the true initial
confidence was simply not able to be determined in many of the cases in the samples used. They concluded that:
“We are far from understanding the value of an eyewitness’s initial high confidence statement in real-world cases
where conditions are not pristine.”32 However, this does not mean that requiring witnesses to assign an initial
confidence rating is inherently bad practice or not useful. Rather, if ratings are provided within the context in
which conditions are as close to pristine as possible (i.e., no pressure, prompting, or encouragement from law
enforcement or others present; not using witness identification if a suspect’s picture has been featured in the
media), and if jurors are apprised of the role of age and other factors in affecting the confidence-accuracy
relationship, the ratings may still have utility at the time of trial. Moreover, there are indications that low
confidence ratings may represent an important red flag of which jurors should take note. Finally, if law
enforcement agencies routinely and faithfully document witnesses’ confidence ratings at the initial identification,
researchers will have more valid data for further examination of their value.
Though it seems common sense that “fillers” used in lineups should look reasonably similar to the suspect, closely
align with the victim’s description of the perpetrator, and that the suspect should not stand out in any way,
anecdotal evidence shows that this is not always the case. Missouri exoneree Johnny Briscoe was convicted of
rape after being selected from a lineup by the victim in which Briscoe was the only person wearing a jail-issued
jumpsuit; the fillers wore street clothes.33 The victim selected him from the lineup, he was subsequently convicted
of sexual assault and other crimes, and went on to serve twenty-three years in prison before a DNA test proved
he was not the culprit. The Innocence Project reports cases in which the suspect was the only person in the lineup
of the same race as the person the witness described. Clearly, law enforcement should include persons in lineups
who bear at least a superficial description to the perpetrator based on the witness’s report, in terms of race,
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ethnicity, size, general body type, and to an extent, with similar features.34 However, it has also been found that
when people view faces that are highly similar to one another, this can confound accuracy of identification.
Therefore, some heterogeneity in the fillers’ features is recommended.35
The most compelling evidence for methods to improve accuracy of eyewitness identification is in regard to the
“double-blind” procedure, in which not only is the witness naïve as to which person in a photo array or an inperson lineup is the suspect, but so is the police officer or other staff person conducting the lineup. When the
lineup administrator knows who the suspect is, the chances of a false positive identification are higher. 36 In his
review of the state of empirical evidence for best eyewitness practices, Findley asserts that this double-blind
procedure is one in which there is the strongest consensus.37 Risinger points to this practice as one with no cost,
in that it lowers the risk of falsely identifying an innocent person and does nothing to reduce the chances that
someone will choose the correct person as the perpetrator.38 This can reduce intentional manipulation, hinting and
coaching the witness. We note that introducing this practice in itself does not impugn the integrity of law
enforcement, because the more likely scenario does not involve intentional signaling, but rather unintentional
verbal and non-verbal cues.
Research also indicates that witnesses should not be shown the same suspect in multiple presentations, such as
viewing the suspect in a photographic array and then again in an in-person lineup. When this occurs, the false
positive rate tends to be high, with witnesses recalling a face not from the actual crime scene, but from the previous
viewing.39 This is especially likely to diminish the accuracy of the identification when there is only one person
who is featured in multiple methods.
Yet another practice, though less often included in standard eyewitness recommendations for reform, involves
presenting photos or live suspects to the witness sequentially, rather than simultaneously. The logic behind this
practice derives from findings that when someone views a simultaneous presentation of photos or live suspects,
s/he makes a relative judgement, treating the process like a multiple-choice test and selecting the photo or person
most similar to his or her recollection of the perpetrator. On the other hand, a sequential selection (even if the
witness is permitted to return to a picture or ask to see a live suspect again), results in an absolute judgement,
meaning that the victim makes a “yes” or “no” decision upon viewing each person. This has been found to lead
to fewer false identifications.40 However, the merits of sequential processing are not entirely confirmed in the
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research, and some studies suggest this method is not tremendously beneficial, potentially leading to higher false
negatives, with a witness failing to recognize the actual perpetrator.41 Yet other research has concluded that the
simultaneous presentation method may improve accuracy by reducing both false negatives and false positives.42
Finally, all of these practices can be enhanced by providing full information regarding the lineup and clear
instructions to the witnesses.43 One very important piece of information that should be conveyed to the witness is
that the actual perpetrator may not be present in the lineup. Thus, the witness is less likely to perceive the lineup
as a “multiple choice test” and feel pressured to make a selection when there is some uncertainty.
We acknowledge the proposed and existing reforms discussed in this section are not without their limitations.
Clark is among a handful of scholars who caution that while these practices can be successful in reducing false
positives, the consequence may be that they can raise the likelihood of false negatives, resulting in a true
perpetrator escaping justice and remaining free to commit more crimes.44 Clark cautions the probative value and
social costs should be carefully weighed when such practices are under consideration. While we do not deny that
there is risk and cost to a guilty person going free, this is most likely to occur in cases in which the case hinges
entirely or heavily on a witness making a proper identification, in the absence of other compelling evidence.
Wixted, et al. responded to Clark’s concerns by arguing that the standard for determining best practice should not
be the probative value, but rather the same standard that is considered the gold standard in medical diagnostics,
the “receiver operator characteristics,” which take into account the proportion of false negatives and false
positives. There are two types of situations in which a “true” suspect is not chosen. The first is when a witness
does not select anyone from the lineup because he or she cannot be certain that someone in the lineup is the person
they saw commit a crime. The second is when a witness is adamant the suspect was not in the lineup; there is no
uncertainty. The latter scenario is the less likely to occur, since police do not typically require witnesses to declare
a firm denial regarding the suspects and fillers presented. While jurors may be swayed by testimony from a
witness who appears confident that s/he did identify the perpetrator from the lineup, we suggest that testimony
from a witness who cannot be certain that the perpetrator was in the lineup may not carry enough weight to
produce an acquittal, particularly if other evidence points to a defendant’s guilt. Moreover, in cases in which the
wrong person is identified as the perpetrator, not only is there a risk of an innocent person being punished, the
risk of the guilty person going unapprehended is also present. 45
Of the various practices, the research involving simultaneous v. sequential presentation of fillers and suspects
appears to have the least consistent empirical support. In their report on recommended best practices, the National
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Research Council noted that the evidence is too inconclusive in this regard, and decided to not include sequential
presentation among their recommended best practices.46 Additional research, both in laboratory settings and based
on data gathered in resolved cases involving eyewitness identification is needed before this practice be among
those mandated by legislatures or other authoritative bodies. Law enforcement agencies that voluntarily adopt the
practice of conducting sequential lineups should carefully monitor the outcomes.
Summary of nationwide changes
Despite the abundant evidence pointing to the utility of most of these measures for improving eyewitness
identification, many agencies have not implemented them.47 The failure of law enforcement agencies to recognize
the value of these reforms is baffling. Similarly, courts have been slow to adopt rules that require jurors be
informed of the limits of eyewitness identification.48 There is also scant information regarding why eyewitness
reform legislative bills are unsuccessful. There are ample resources available to these agencies and the units of
government that oversee them regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification and how to improve its
inaccuracy and reduce the chances of misidentification.
As of February 2021, twenty-four states had passed laws that regulated some aspects of eyewitness identification
procedures and use as evidence. These laws pertain to either court or law enforcement practices, or both. Other
states have voluntarily adopted model policies in this regard, in some places bolstered by support from attorneys
general.49 Just sixteen states, with Missouri among them, have neither legislation nor model policies in place.
Obviously, such laws are weakened when there are no sanctions for compliance. In his article “The Promise and
Pitfalls of State Identification Reforms,” Kahn-Fogel noted some states that have mandated that law enforcement
use best practices with regard to eyewitness evidence have failed to include penalties for agencies that do not
adhere to the law.50
Missouri situation
Missouri is divided into 115 counties, most of which have multiple local law enforcement agencies in addition to
a county-wide sheriff’s department, with a total of 656 law enforcement agencies statewide.51 This count includes
the county and city/municipal departments, campus police departments, and the following statewide agencies,
which are classified as law enforcement agencies: Missouri Capitol Police, Missouri Department of Revenue,
Missouri Natural Resources -Park Rangers, Missouri Department of Conservation, Missouri Division of Fire
Safety, Missouri Department of Social Services State Technical Assistance Team, and Missouri State Highway
Patrol. The Missouri State Highway Patrol and all of the county and city/municipal agencies investigate crimes,
resulting in hundreds of Missouri law enforcement entities that may, at one time or another, rely on eyewitness
identification to solve crimes. County department sheriffs typically report to a county executive, while
city/municipal police chiefs are supervised by mayors, city councils, or a combination of these. Barring statewide
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mandates, they have tremendous discretion in crafting and implementing policies and procedures, including
investigative procedures and use of eyewitnesses to identify suspects.
Missouri Senate Bill 162, introduced in 2013, was intended to mandate law enforcement agencies adopt a set of
policies to be used during eyewitness procedures. This bill included other measures designed to reduce chances
of a wrongful conviction, such as post-conviction DNA testing and procedures for using “jailhouse informants.”
A similar bill, House Bill 1840, was proposed the following year, followed by SB 303 in 2015, and yet another
in SB 842 in 2016. All failed to pass. The bills contained a list of procedures that reflected empirically-based best
practices for improving the accuracy of eyewitness identification in criminal investigations. These included (a)
using “double blind” lineups, in which the police officer or other law enforcement representative conducting the
lineup does not know who the actual suspect is; (b) verbatim documentation of the witnesses’ confidence in
identification of the suspect; (c) providing the witness with a set of instructions that, among other things, notifies
him/her that it is not known if the actual perpetrator is in the lineup; (d) requiring a minimum of four “fillers” in
a live lineup and five fillers in a photo lineup, and further, ensuring such fillers should resemble the witness’s
description of the perpetrator; (e) restricting witness from viewing multiple lineups with the same suspect and
varying fillers used; and (f) videotaping the lineup and identification process, or, if not possible, taking still
photographs and a detailed record of the process with a requirement to record specific details. SB 162 was the
only one of these bills that stipulated use of sequential presentation in lineups, as opposed to simultaneous ones.
Given the mixed findings about the value of this practice noted previously, it may be best not to stipulate it in
future legislative proposals, unless future research offers stronger support.
Arguably, the 2013 Missouri Senate bill, SB 162, and House version, HB 1840, represented the stronger bills in
that the following text was included:
(1) Failure to comply with any of the requirements of this section shall be considered by the court in
adjudicating motions to suppress eyewitness identification;
(2) Failure to comply with any of the requirements of this section shall be admissible in support of claims
of eyewitness misidentification, as long as such evidence is otherwise admissible; and
(3) When evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of this section has been
presented at trial, the jury shall be instructed that it may consider credible evidence of compliance or
noncompliance to determine the reliability of eyewitness identification.52
Thus, the bill would help ensure that non-compliant agencies were warned that the evidence they submit from
eyewitness identifications may not carry much weight in court if they had failed to use best practices when
obtaining identifications.
Former Missouri Representative Jay Swearingen, who co-sponsored House Bill 1840 in 2014, could not recall
any specific resistance to the content nor concept of the bill. Rather, as best he could recollect, the bill failed
because it originated “on the wrong side of the aisle.” Swearingen and his co-sponsor, former Representative J.
T. Berry, were both Democrats serving in a heavily Republican-dominated legislature.53
In a 2018 article by the Pew Foundation,54 it was noted that the California Police Chiefs Association opposed a
legislative bill for reforming eyewitness procedures for three reasons: the challenges when applying these
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procedures in lineups conducted in the field (as opposed to a police station); the situation in certain cases, such
as gang-related crimes, where officers develop a rapport with witnesses who may not be as trusting if asked to
identify suspects by a different officer (to ensure a “double-blind lineup”); and the cost of maintaining videotapes,
particularly for smaller departments. We were unable to locate any research from those states that have
implemented best practices that the first two issues have hampered effective investigation and enforcement of
laws. However, we concede that agencies will need to build in the cost of videotaping into their budgets, as they
have when required to videotape confessions or save body camera footage. When sufficient funding for
videotaping is not available, the option of taking still photographs and a written log of the eyewitness procedure
may be a useful alternative.
Argument in favor and benefits
The bulk of evidence accumulated to date demonstrates that eyewitnesses, for a variety of reasons, make mistakes
when identifying suspects, and that subsequent courtroom testimony is flawed. Moreover, unless jurisdictions
have implemented procedures, such as routinely including expert testimony on the topic, or instructing jurors
regarding the limitations of eyewitness identification, jurors may place a great deal of weight on this testimony.
The potential consequences of continuing to rely on eyewitness evidence without taking steps to ensure its
accuracy, or at least ensure jurors’ understanding of its fallibility, are enormous. Actual perpetrators might evade
arrest and go on to commit more crimes, both because a witness fails to recognize a suspect who is the actual
perpetrator, and because the true perpetrator goes undetected when the witness chooses the wrong person. And,
as discussed earlier, innocent people may be arrested, convicted, and serve decades in prison for crimes they did
not commit. Thus, the stakes are high in terms of protecting public safety and ensuring that our criminal justice
system is fair and just.
Law enforcement agencies that choose to adopt the evidence-based practices discussed herein may find there are
other benefits. Showing good faith efforts to strengthen investigative procedures and reduce wrongful arrests
improves police-citizen relationships. Agencies can demonstrate they are progressive and evidence-based,
enhancing agency competency and their reputations.
Adoption of these practices need not be costly nor time-intensive. The time investment needed to reduce the
probability of a tainted identification is minimal, and carries little, if any, fiscal burden. There is, of course, some
cost and time commitment involved with training officers on proper procedures. However, as noted earlier in this
article, there are abundant resources available to guide law enforcement agencies in developing and implementing
new protocols. Moreover, larger agencies may find it cost-efficient and practical to train a small group of officers
to function as that agency’s designated specialists in matters involving eyewitnesses. Finally, states that opt to
mandate use of best practices can also consider mandating training academies to include a module on these
practices, for both new and seasoned officers.
The primary objection to legislative mandates is the threat they pose to local autonomy — similar to the arguments
put forth in response to national or state mandates directed at public schools. Some broad mandates may not be
suited for all local jurisdictions and therefore, locally crafted policies may be preferable and best meet the needs
of different groups of citizens with various needs and interests. Yet this argument does not hold up well in regard
to law enforcement and eyewitness reforms. These practices are unlikely to have unintended negative
consequences, and if they do, these are outweighed by their benefits. Moreover, they are almost apolitical in
content — as likely to be accepted by conservatives as liberals. Unlike more controversial law enforcement and
court reforms, such as mandatory body cameras, abolishing certain methods used for restraining suspects, and
even eliminating bargains for jailhouse informants, they are not burdensome and do not hamstring police officers.
It would be ideal if law enforcement agencies were to voluntarily adopt the best practices for using eyewitnesses
in investigations, relying on persuasion, incremental change, and modeling of best practices by high-profile
agencies. Yet this is unlikely to occur on a large scale. Missouri is not unusual in terms of the sheer number of
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law enforcement agencies that operate independently of one another. These agencies are accustomed to
functioning with a high level of autonomy in regard to many of their day-to-day tasks and practices. There are
jurisdictional and geographic barriers as well as varying oversight arrangements within local governments that
constrain voluntary change statewide. Chiefs, sheriffs, and other agency heads may know little about best
practices and the empirical evidence supporting these, and detectives and front-line officers may know even less,
since these practices are not part of standard police academy curricula. As a result, agencies continue to pursue
the path of “this is how we’ve always done it.”
Considering the vast body of evidence supporting specific eyewitness reforms, the risks inherent in not doing so,
and the availability of pragmatic educational resources on the topic, it is puzzling why most law enforcement
agencies across the United States have yet to embrace these practices. The failure to do so suggests that their
value is not recognized among agency leaders and front-line staff, or implementation is not prioritized.
Missouri’s General Assembly should follow the example of those states that have passed laws requiring law
enforcement agencies follow best practices in regard to use of eyewitnesses. The simplest measure would be to
resurrect the previously introduced bills, particularly SB 162 or HB 1840. Further, they should require or
incentivize Missouri law enforcement training academies to adopt instructional modules on the procedures.
Conclusion
Unquestionably, police are tasked with responsibilities that often have no easy solutions and are the results of
more widespread social problems. Despite the focus of some reformers for greater accountability within police
departments, these public agencies’ inability to eradicate issues such as homelessness, substance abuse, lack of
economic opportunities, poor parenting practices, and other social ills cannot be counted against them. While they
are in a position to collaborate with other parts of government to impact societal challenges, they cannot do so
alone in light of the magnitude of these problems, the lack of resources they have to address them, the inadequate
level of evidence to guide professional practice, and the political controversies inherent in overcoming them.
Instead, this article offers a specific police reform that is entirely within the control of police departments, is not
resource intensive, is supported by empirical research, and is relatively uncontroversial politically. In contrast to
the more controversial reform measures promoted to stem police misconduct, our recommendations represent an
achievable incremental improvement that strengthens the legitimacy of the criminal justice process and furthers
evidence-based practice within policing.

